Abstract. This paper presents a new signature forgery strategy. The attack is a sophisticated variant of Desmedt-Odlyzko's method [11] where the attacker obtains the signatures of m1, . . . , mτ−1 and exhibits the signature of an mτ which was never submitted to the signer; we assume that all messages are padded by a redundancy function µ before being signed. Before interacting with the signer, the attacker selects τ smooth 1 µ(mi)-values and expresses µ(mτ ) as a multiplicative combination of the padded strings µ(m1), . . . , µ(mτ−1). The signature of mτ is then forged using the homomorphic property of RSA. A padding format that differs from iso 9796-1 by one single bit was broken experimentally (we emphasize that we could not extend our attack to iso 9796-1); for iso 9796-2 the attack is more demanding but still much more efficient than collision-search or factoring. For din ni-17.4, pkcs #1 v2.0 and ssl-3.02, the attack is only theoretical since it only applies to specific moduli and happens to be less efficient than factoring; therefore, the attack does not endanger any of these standards.
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Introduction
At a recent count (http://www.rsa.com), over 300 million RSA-enabled products had been shipped worldwide. This popularity, and the ongoing standardiza-tions of signature and encryption formats [2, 13, [20] [21] [22] 36] highlight the need to challenge claims that such standards eradicate RSA's multiplicative properties.
Exponentiation is homomorphic and RSA-based protocols are traditionally protected against chosen-plaintext forgeries [9, 11, 35] by using a padding (or redundancy) function µ to make sure that:
RSA(µ(x)) × RSA(µ(y)) = RSA(µ(x × y)) mod n In general, µ(x) hashes x and concatenates its digest to pre-defined strings; in some cases, substitution and permutation are used as well.
While most padding schemes gain progressive recognition as time goes by, several specific results exist: a few functions were broken by ad-hoc analysis ( [16, 24] showed, for instance, that homomorphic dependencies can still appear in µ(m) = a × m + b) while at the other extreme, assuming that the underlying building-blocks are ideal, some functions [5, 6] are provably secure in the random oracle model.
The contribution of this paper is that the complexity of forging chosen message-signature pairs is sometimes much lower than that of breaking RSA • µ by frontal attacks (factoring and collision-search). The strategy introduced in this article does not challenge RSA's traditional security assumptions; instead, it seeks for multiplicative relations using the expected smoothness of moderatesize integers (the technique is similar in this respect to the quadratic sieve [33] , the number field sieve [32] and the index-calculus method for computing discrete logarithm [1] ).
As usual, our playground will be a setting in which the attacker A and the signer S interact as follows:
-A asks S to provide the signatures of τ − 1 chosen messages (τ being polylogarithmically-bounded in n). S will, of course, correctly pad all the plaintexts before raising them to his secret power d. -After the query phase and some post-processing, A must exhibit the signature of at least one message (m τ ) which has never been submitted to S.
Previous work: Misarsky's PKC'98 invited survey [30] is probably the best documented reference on multiplicative RSA forgeries. Davida's observation [9] is the basis of most RSA forgery techniques. [16, 24] forge signatures that are similar to pkcs #1 v2.0 but do not produce their necessary SHA/MD5 digests [31, 34] . [15] analyzes the security of RSA signatures in an interactive context. Michels et al. [28] create relations between the exponents of de Jonge-Chaum and Boyd's schemes; their technique extends to blind-RSA but does not apply to any of the padding schemes attacked in this paper. Baudron and Stern [4] apply lattice reduction to analyze the security of RSA • µ in a security-proof perspective. A Desmedt-Odlyzko variant [11] applicable to padded RSA signatures is sketched in section 3.5 of [30] . It consists in factoring µ(m τ ) into small primes and obtaining the e-th roots of these primes from multiplicative combinations of signatures of messages which µ(m i )-values are smooth. The signature of m τ is forged by multiplying the e-th roots of the factors of µ(m τ ). The complexity of this attack depends on the size of µ and not on the size of n; the approach is thus inapplicable to padding formats having the modulus' size (e.g. iso 9796-2). In this paper we extend this strategy to padding schemes for which a linear combination of n and the padded value is small; when applied to William's scheme our attack allows to factor n.
A General Outline
Let {n, e} be an RSA public key and d be the corresponding secret key. Although in this paper µ will alternatively denote iso 9796-2, pkcs #1 v2.0, ansi x9.31, ssl-3.02 or an iso 9796-1 variant denoted F, we will start by describing our attack in a simpler scenario where µ is SHA-1 or MD5 (in other words, messages will only be hashed before being exponentiated); the attack will be later adapted to the different padding standards mentioned above.
The outline of our idea is the following: since µ(m) is rather short (128 or 160 bits), the probability that µ(m) is -smooth (for a reasonably small ) is small but non-negligible; consequently, if A can obtain the signatures of chosen smooth µ(m i )-values, then he could look for a message m τ such that µ(m τ ) has no bigger factors than p k (the k-th prime) and construct µ(m τ ) d mod n as a multiplicative combination of the signatures of the chosen plaintexts m 1 , . . . , m τ −1 .
The difficulty of finding -smooth digests is a function of and the size of µ(m). Defining ψ(x, y) = #{v < x, such that v is y-smooth}, it is known [12, 14, 19] that, for large x, the ratio ψ(x, t √ x)/x is equivalent to Dickman's function defined by:
is thus an approximation of the probability that a u-bit number is 2 u/tsmooth; since ρ(t) is somewhat cumbersome to compute, we refer the reader to appendix A for a lookup table.
Before we proceed, let us illustrate the concerned orders of magnitude. Referring to appendix A, we see that the probability that SHA/MD5 digests are 2 24 -smooth is rather high ( ∼ = 2 −19 , 2 −13 ); this means that finding smooth digests would be practically feasible. This was confirmed by extensive simulations as illustrated by:
Several heuristics can, of course, accelerate the search: in our experiments, we factored only digests beginning or ending by a few zeroes; the optimal number of zeroes being a function of the running times of the attacker's hashing and factorization algorithms (parallelization is also possible).
In any case, denoting by L the size of the digest and by F (L) the factoring cost, the complexity of finding p k -smooth digests is:
this is justified by the fact that p k -smooth L-bit digests are expected only once per 1/ρ(L/ log 2 (p k )) and that the most straightforward way to factor L is k trial divisions by the first primes (where each division costs L log 2 (p i ) bitoperations).
These formulae should, however, be handled with extreme caution for the following reasons:
-Although in complexity terms L can be analyzed as a variable, one should constantly keep in mind that L is a fixed value because the output size of specific hash functions is not extensible. -Trial division is definitely not the best candidate for F (L). In practice, our program used the following strategy to detect the small factors of µ(m): since very small divisors are very common, it is worthwhile attempting trial and error division up to p i ∼ = 2048 before applying a primality test to µ(m) (the candidate is of course rejected if the test fails). As a next step, trial and error division by primes smaller than 15, 000 is performed and the resulting number is handed-over to Pollard-Brent's algorithm [7] which is very good at finding small factors. Since it costs O( √ p i ) to pull-out p i using Pollard-
The Attack
The attack applies to RSA and Williams' scheme [37] ; we assume that the reader is familiar with RSA but briefly recall Williams' scheme, denoting by J(x), the Jacobi symbol of x with respect to n. In Williams' scheme µ(m) = 6 mod 16 and:
Before signing, S must check that J(µ(m)) = 1. If J(µ(m)) = −1, µ(m) is replaced by µ(m)/2 to guarantee that J(µ(m)) = 1 since J(2) = −1.
A signature s is valid if w = s 2 mod n is such that:
Finding homomorphic dependencies
The attack's details slightly differ between the RSA and Williams' scheme. For RSA, τ − 1 chosen signatures will yield an additional µ(m τ ) d mod n while in Williams' case, τ chosen signatures will factor n. All chosen messages have the property that there exists a linear combination of µ(m i ) and n such that:
where b i is p k -smooth as well.
It follows that µ(m i ) is the modular product of small primes:
Let us associate to each µ(m i ) a k-dimensional vector V i with coordinates v i,j taken modulo the public exponent e:
We can now express, by Gaussian elimination, one of these vectors (reindexed as V τ ) as a linear combination of the others:
From equation (1) we get:
For RSA, the forger will submit the τ − 1 first messages to S and forge the signature of m τ by:
In Williams' case, the signature of m τ will be computed from the other signatures using equation (2) if J(x) = 1, using the fact that:
If J(x) = −1, then u 2 = x 2 mod n and (u − x)(u + x) = 0 mod n. Since J(x) = − J(u) we have x = ±u mod n and GCD(u − x, n) will factor n. A can thus submit the τ messages to S, recover u, factor n and sign any message.
Expected complexity
It remains, however, to estimate τ as a function of k:
• In the most simple setting e is prime and the set of vectors with k coordinates over Z e is a k-dimensional linear space; τ = k + 1 vectors are consequently sufficient to guarantee that (at least) one of the vectors can be expressed as a linear combination (easily found by Gaussian elimination) of the other vectors.
• When e is the r-th power of a prime p, τ = k + 1 vectors are again sufficient to ensure that (at least) one vector can be expressed as a linear combination of the others. Using the p-adic expansion of the vectors' coefficients and Gaussian elimination on k + 1 vectors, we can write one of the vectors as a linear combination of the others.
• Finally, the previous argument can be extended to the most general case:
where it appears that τ = 1 + ωk = O(k log e) vectors are sufficient to guarantee that (at least) one vector is a linear combination of the others; modulo each of the p ri i , the attacker can find a set T i of (ω − 1)k + 1 vectors, each of which can be expressed by Gaussian elimination as a linear combination of k other vectors. Intersecting the T i and using Chinese remaindering, one gets that (at least) one vector must be a linear combination of the others modulo e.
The overall complexity of our attack can therefore be bounded by:
and the attacker can optimize his resources by operating at a k where C L,k is minimal. Space complexity (dominated by the Gaussian elimination) is O(k 2 log 3 e).
Analyzing Different Signature Formats
4.1 The security of iso/iec-9796-1-like signatures iso/iec-9796-1 [21] was published in 1991 by ISO as the first international standard for digital signatures. It specifies padding formats applicable to algorithms providing message recovery (algorithms are not explicit but map r bits to r bits). iso 9796-1 is not hashing-based and there are apparently no attacks [16, 18] other than factoring on this scheme ( [30] : "...iso 9796-1 remains beyond the reach of all multiplicative attacks known today..."). The scheme is used to sign messages of limited length and works as follows when n and m are respectively N = 2γ + 1 and γ-bit numbers and γ = 4 is a multiple of eight.
Define
Lettings(x) force the most significant bit in s(x) to 1 ands(x) complement the least significant bit of s(x), iso 9796-1 specifies:
The attack that we are about to describe applies to a slight variant of iso 9796-1 wheres(x) is replaced by s(x); this variant (denoted F) differs from iso 9796-1 by one single bit.
Let a j denote nibbles and consider messages of the form:
which F-padding is:
Restricting the choice of a 6 to the (eight) nibbles for which s =s, we can generate 2 23 numbers of the form µ(m i ) = x × Γ 23 where x is the 8-byte number s(a 6
Using k = 3000 we forged thousands of 1024-bit F-signatures in less than a day on a Pentium-PC (an example is given in appendix C). The attack is applicable to any (64 × c + 1)-bit modulus and its complexity is independent of c ∈ N (once computed, the same x-strings work with any such n). The attack is equally applicable to 32, 48, 80, 96 or 112-bit x-strings (which yield 7, 15, 31, 39 and 47-bit plaintext spaces); a combined attack, mixing xstrings of different types is also possible (this has the drawback of adding the unknowns Γ 7 , Γ 15 , . . . but improves the probability of finding p k -smooth x-strings). Long plain-English messages ending by the letter f can be forged using a more technical approach sketched in appendix B (66 16 represents the ASCII character f). Note, as a mere curiosity, a slight ( ∼ = 11%) experimental deviation from formula (3) due to the non-uniform distribution of the x-strings (which most and least significant bits can never be long sequences of zeroes). Finally, since the powers of 2 and Γ 23 are identical, one can use k chosen messages instead of k + 1, packing p 1 = 2 and p k+1 = Γ 23 into the updated unknown p 1 = 2Γ 23 .
Non-impact on iso 9796-1: The authors could not extend the attack to iso 9796-1 and it would be wrong to state that iso 9796-1 is broken.
Note: When we first looked into the standard, we did not notices and we are grateful to Peter Landrock and Jørgen Brandt for drawing our attention to that. It appears from our discussions with iso/jtc1/sc27 thats (the alteration that codes the message-border) has also been introduced to prevent arithmetic operations on µ(m); further information on iso 9796-1 and our attack on F will be soon posted on http://www.iso.ch/jtc1/sc27.
The security of iso 9796-2 signatures
iso 9796-2 is a generic padding standard allowing total or partial message recovery. Hash-functions of different sizes are acceptable and parameter L (in the standard k h ) is consequently a variable. Section 5, note 4 of [22] recommends 64 ≤ L ≤ 80 for total recovery (typically an iso 10118-2 [23] ) and 128 ≤ L ≤ 160 for partial recovery. N by n we obtain:
where n is N + 7 bits long and n [1] is N − L − 16 bits long. Setting m[1] = n [1] we get:
where the size of t is less than L + 16 bits. The forger can thus modify m [2] (and therefore HASH(m)) until he gets a set of messages which t-values are p k -smooth and express one such µ(m τ ) as a multiplicative combination of the others.
Note that the attack is again independent of the size of n (forging 1024-bit signatures is not harder than forging 512-bit ones) but, unlike our F-attack, forged messages are specific to a given n and can not be recycled when attacking different moduli.
To optimize efforts, A must use the k minimizing C L+16,k . Although the optimal time complexities for L = 160 and L = 128 are lower than the birthday complexities of SHA and MD5 we consider that L = 160 implementations are still reasonably secure. L = k h optimal log 2 k log 2 time log 2 space  128  18  54  36  160  20  61  40   Table 2 . Attacks on iso 9796-2, small public exponent.
Total message recovery. Assuming again that the hash function is known to both parties, that N and L are multiples of eight and that the size of m is N − L − 16, function µ is: 
where the size of t is less than L + + 16 bits.
A will thus modify m[0] (and therefore HASH(m)) as needed and conclude the attack as in the partial recovery case. must be tuned to expect just enough p k -smooth t-values with a reasonably high probability i.e.:
The complexities summarized in the following table (a few PC-weeks for k h = 64) seem to suggest a revision of this standard. Note that our attack would have applied as well to:
In which case take n = i × n such that n mod 256 = BC 16 and use m to replicate the least significant bits of n ; subtraction will then yield a moderate size integer times of a power of two.
An elegant protection against our attack is described in [13] (its security is basically comparable to that of pkcs #1 v2.0, discussed later on in this paper); a second efficient solution, suggested by Jean-Jacques Quisquater in the rump session of crypto'97 is:
4.3 Analyzing pkcs #1 v2.0, ssl-3.02 and ansi x9.31
This section describes theoretical attacks on pkcs #1 v2.0, ssl-3.02 and ansi x9.31 which are better than the birthday-paradox. Since our observations are not general (for they apply to moduli of the form n = 2 k ± c) and more demanding than factorization, they do not endanger current implementations of these standards. It appears that n = 2 k ± c offers regular 1024-bit RSA security as far as c is not much smaller than 2 500 , and square-free c-values as small as 400 bits may even be used [25] . In general (n > 2 512 ) such moduli appear to offer regular security as long as log 2 (c) ∼ = log 2 (n)/2 and c is square-free [26] .
Although particular, n = 2 k ± c has been advocated by a number of cryptographers for it allows trial and error divisions to be avoided. For instance, the informative annex of iso 9796-1 recommends "...some forms of the modulus (n = 2 k ± c) [that] simplify the modulo reduction and need less table storage.". Note however, that even in our worst scenario, iso 9796-1's particular form is still secure: for 1024-bit moduli, iso 9796-1 recommends a 767-bit c whereas our attack will require a 400-bit c. The reader is referred to section 14.3.4 of [27] for further references on n = 2 k ± c. Assume that we are given a 1024-bit n = 2 k − c, where = log 2 (c) ∼ = 400 and c is square-free; we start by analyzing ssl-3.02 where:
is an -bit number on which we conduct an iso 9796-2-like attack which expected complexity is C ,k .
The characteristics of the attack are summarized in table 3 which should be compared to the birthday paradox (2 144 time, negligible space) and the hardness of factorization ({time, space} denote the base-two logarithms of the time and space complexities of the attacks):
The phenomenon also scales-down to pkcs #1 v2.0 where: Table 4 . Estimates for pkcs #1 v2.0 and ansi x9.31, small public exponent.
and:
These figures appear roughly equivalent to a birthday-attack on SHA, even for rather small (550-bit) moduli. Note that the attack applies to n = 2 k + c by computing n − 2 14 × µ(m). Note : In a recent correspondence, Burt Kaliski informed us that Ron Rivest developed in 1991 a forgery strategy which is a simple case of the one described in this paper; the design of pkcs #1 v1.5 took this into account, but Ron's observation was never published. Further information on our attack will appear soon in an RSA bulletin http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/.
A similar analysis where the prescribed moduli begin by 6BBBBB . . . 16 is applicable to ansi x9.31 (yielding exactly the same complexities as for pkcs #1 v2.0) where:
ansi x9.31 recommends to avoid n = 2 k ± c. If one strictly follows the standard n = 6BBBBB . . . 16 can not occur (the standard requires a bit length which is a multiple of eight) but one could in theory work with 2µ(m) instead of µ(m).
Finally, we will consider a theoretical setting in which an authority certifies moduli generated by users who wish to join a network; naturally, users never reveal their secret keys but using storage optimizations as a pretext, the authority implements an ID-based scheme where different random looking bits (registration ID, account numbers etc) are forced into the most significant bits of each n [26] . Users generate moduli having the prescribed patterns they receive.
If the authority can find two small constants {u, v} such that:
then our attack would extend to moduli which are not necessarily of the form 2 k ± c. To do so, oversimplify the setting to µ(m) = (2 w − 1) · f (m) and n = n[1] · n[0] where n[0] has the size of f (m) and substitute these definitions in equation (4):
since the authority has no control over f (m), the best thing to do would be to request that u × n[1] = v × (2 w − 1) which results in an η ∼ = log 2 (f (m)) + log 2 (max{u, v}).
The authority can thus prescribe moduli which most significant bits are v i × (2 w − 1)/u i where u i are moderate-size factors of 2 w − 1. Such factors look random and should not raise the user's suspicion.
We can therefore conclude that although practically safe, the use of authorityspecified moduli in fixed-pattern padding contexts might be an interesting theoretical playground.
Conclusion and Further Research
Although the analysis presented in this paper indicates a weakness in iso 9796-2 when k h ∼ = 64, products using this standard should not be systematically withdrawn; a few product analyzes reveal that system-level specifications (message contents, insufficient access to S etc.) frequently make real-life attacks harder than expected.
It seems reasonable (although we can not base our belief on formal grounds) that good message recovery padding schemes should be usable for encryption as well; we motivate this recommendation by the functional similarity between RSA encryption and message recovery.
Full-domain-hash offers the best possible protection against our attack and we advocate its systematic use whenever possible. If impossible, it seems appropriate to link L and N since for a fixed L there is necessarily a point (birthday) above which increasing N will slow-down the legitimate parties without improving security.
We also recommend four research directions:
-An integer is {a, p k }-semismooth [3] if each of its prime factors is smaller than a and all but one are smaller than p k . A well known-strategy (called the large prime variant) consists of searching, using the birthday paradox, {a, p k }-semismooth {µ(x), µ(y)} pairs having an identical large prime factor (e.g. 80-bits long); the ratio µ(x)/µ(y) mod n can then be used as one p ksmooth input in the Gaussian elimination. -It might be interesting to find out if our F-attack could handles by using a different Γ :
In which case x-values should end by the pattern 2266 16 , be p k -smooth and such that x = x/∆ is a valid message header. Note that different ∆-values might be mixed in the same attack, using a large prime variant where the different Γ -values are eliminated by modular division. -Although we have no specific instances for the moment, one could also try to combine our technique with [4] to speed-up forgery in specific situations. -Finally, it appears that incomplete ad-hoc analyzes of hash-functions (building digests with u prescribed bits in less than 2 u operations) could be the source of new problems in badly designed padding schemes.
The table uses the exact formula (section 2) for t ≤ 10 and de Bruijn's approximation [8] for t > 10:
where ζ is the positive solution of e ζ − 1 = tζ and γ is Euler's constant.
APPENDIX B
The attack's time-consuming part is the exhaustive-search of k appropriate xstrings; therefore, when one wants the x-strings to be 256-bits long, the increase in k makes the attack impractical.
To overcome this problem, we suggest the following: as a first step, collect the signatures corresponding to moderate-size p k -smooth x-strings (which are relatively easy to find) and extract from their appropriate multiplicative combinations the e-th roots of the k first primes. Then, exhaustive-search two plainEnglish 128-bit messages {m, m } ending by the letter f such that µ(m)/Γ and µ(m )/Γ are both p k -smooth, with:
256(c−1) + . . . + 2 256 + 1 for a (256×c+1)-bit modulus. Since we only need two such numbers, the overall workload is very tolerable. Next, submit m to S and divide its signature by the e-th roots of its small prime factors to recover Γ d mod n. Using Γ d mod n and the e-th roots of the k first primes we can now forge, by multiplication, the signature of m .
APPENDIX C
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